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Abstract
This paper is devoted to measuring the security of cyber networks under advanced persistent threats (APTs). First,
an APT-based cyber attack-defense process is modeled as an individual-level dynamical system. Second, the dynamic
model is shown to exhibit the global stability. On this basis, a new security metric of cyber networks, which is
known as the limit security, is defined as the limit expected fraction of compromised nodes in the networks. Next, the
influence of different factors on the limit security is illuminated through theoretical analysis and computer simulation.
This work helps understand the security of cyber networks under APTs.
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1. Introduction
Cyberspace has come to be an integral part of our society. Government agencies, schools, hospitals, corporations,
financial institutions and other organizations ceaselessly collect, process, and store a great deal of data on computers
and transmit these confidential data across networks to other computers [1, 2]. However, cyberspace is vulnerable
to a wide range of cyber threats. Sophisticated cyber perpetrators exploit vulnerabilities to steal information and
money and develop capabilities to disrupt and destroy essential cyber services. In light of the risk and potential
consequences of cyber attacks, strengthening the security and resilience of cyberspace has become an important
mission. Cybersecurity is committed to protecting computers, networks, programs and data from unintended or
unauthorized access, change, or destruction [3–5]. You cannot manage if you cannot measure. Before working out
cyberspace security solutions, the security of cyber networks must be evaluated [6–8].
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Advanced persistent threats (APTs) are a newly emerging class of cyber attacks. With a clear goal, an APT
attack is highly targeted, well-organized, well-resourced, covert and long-term [9–11]. APTs pose a severe threat to
cyberspace, because they invalidate conventional cyber defense mechanisms. In the last decade, the number of APTs
increased rapidly and numerous security incidents were reported all over the world [12]. For the purpose of resisting
APTs, it is vital to evaluate the security of cyber networks under APTs. However, due to the persistence of APTs,
existing security evaluation methods are not applicable to APTs [13–17]. Recently, Pendleton et al. [18] considered
the expected fraction of compromised nodes in a cyber network as a security metric of the network. As the fraction is
varying over time, its availability is questionable.
To measure the security of a cyber network under APTs, an APT-based cyber attack-defense process must be
modeled as a continuous-time dynamical system. The individual-level dynamical modeling technique, which has
been applied to areas such as epidemic spreading [19–21], malware spreading [22–29], rumor spreading [30, 31] and
viral marketing [32], is especially suited to the modeling of APT-based cyber attack-defense processes, because the
topological structure of the targeted cyber network can be accommodated [33]. Towards this direction, a number of
APT-based cyber attack-defense models have been proposed [34–36]. In particular, Zheng et al. [37] found that a
special APT-based cyber attack-defense model exhibits a global stability.
This paper focuses on estimating security of cyber networks under APTs. First, an APT-based cyber attack-
defense process is modeled as an individual-level dynamical system. Second, the dynamic model is shown to exhibit
the global stability. On this basis, a new security metric of cyber networks, which is known as the limit security, is
defined as the limit expected fraction of compromised nodes in the networks. Next, the influence of different factors
on the limit security is illuminated through theoretical analysis and computer simulation. This work helps understand
the security of cyber networks under APTs.
The remaining materials are organized this way. Section 2 derives an APT-based cyber attack-defense model.
Section 3 shows the global stability of the model and defines the limit security of cyber networks. The influence of
different factors on the limit security is made clear in Sections 4 and 5. Finally, Section 6 closes this work.
2. The modeling of APT-based cyber attack-defense processes
For the purpose of evaluating the security of a cyber network under APTs, understanding the relevant cyber attack-
defense process is requisite. This is the goal of this section.
2.1. The cyber network
Let G = (V, E) denote the network interconnecting computers in a given cyber network, where V = {1, · · · ,N},
each node represents a computer in the cyber network, and there is an edge from node i to node j if and only if
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computer i is allowed to deliver messages directly to computer j through the network. Let A =
(
ai j
)
N×N denote the
adjacency matrix for G. Hereafter, G is assumed to be strongly connected.
In what follows, it is assumed that, at any time, every node in the cyber network is either secure or compromised,
where all secure nodes are under the defender’s control, and all compromised nodes are under the attacker’s control.
Let Xi(t) = 0 and 1 denote that node i is secure and compromised at time t, respectively. Then the state of the cyber
network at time t is represented by the vector
X(t) = (X1(t), X2(t), · · · , XN(t)).
Let S i(t) and Ci(t) denote the probability of node i being secure and compromised at time t, respectively.
S i(t) = Pr{Xi(t) = 0}, Ci(t) = Pr{Xi(t) = 1}.
As S i(t) + Ci(t) ≡ 1, the vector C(t) = (C1(t), · · · ,CN(t))T represents the expected state of the cyber network at time t.
2.2. The attack and defense mechanisms
The threat of an APT attack to the cyber network is twofold.
• External attack, which is conducted by the external attacker, with the intent of compromising the secure nodes
in the network. The attack strength to secure node i is αxi, where α stands for the technical level of external
attack, xi stands for the resource per unit time used for attacking node i,
∑N
i=1 xi > 0.
• Internal infection, which is caused by the compromised nodes in the network, with the intent of compromising
the secure nodes in the network. The infection strength of compromised node i to secure node j is βai j, where
β stands for the technical level of internal infection. The combined infection strength to secure node i at time t
is f
(
β
∑N
j=1 a ji1{x j(t)=1}
)
, where 1A stands for the indicator function of event A, f (0) = 0, f (x) ≤ x for all x ≥ 0,
f is strictly increasing and concave, and f is second continuously differentiable.
We refer to the vector x = (x1, · · · , xN) as an attack scheme. The resource per unit time for the attack scheme x is
||x||1 = ∑Ni=1 xi, where || · ||1 stands for the 1-norm of vectors. .
The defense of the cyber network against APTs is also twofold.
• Prevention, which aims to prevent the secure nodes in the cyber network from being compromised. The pre-
vention strength of secure node i is δyi, where δ stands for the technical level of prevention, yi > 0 stands for
the resource per unit time used for preventing node i.
• Recovery, which is intended to recover the compromised nodes in the cyber network. The recovery strength of
compromised i is γzi, where γ stands for the technical level of recovery, zi > 0 stands for the resource per unit
time for recovering node i.
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We refer to the vector y = (y1, · · · , yN) as a prevention scheme, the vector z = (z1, · · · , zN) as a recovery scheme,
and the vector (y, z) as a defense scheme. The resources per unit time for the prevention scheme y, the recovery
scheme y and the defense scheme (y, z) are ||y||1, ||z||1 and ||y||1 + ||z||1, respectively.
Let w = (w1, · · · ,wN) denote an attack scheme or a prevention scheme or a recovery scheme. In the subsequent
study, the following two schemes will be used.
• The degree-first scheme: wi is linearly proportional to the out-degree of node i. Formally,
w = ||w||1 ·
 ∑Nj=1 a1 j∑N
i, j=1 ai j
,
∑N
j=1 a2 j∑N
i, j=1 ai j
, · · · ,
∑N
j=1 aN j∑N
i, j=1 ai j
 .
• The degree-last scheme: wi is inversely linearly proportional to the out-degree of node i. Formally,
w = ||w||1 ·

1∑N
j=1 a1 j∑N
i=1
1∑N
j=1 ai j
,
1∑N
j=1 a2 j∑N
i=1
1∑N
j=1 ai j
, · · · ,
1∑N
j=1 aN j∑N
i=1
1∑N
j=1 ai j
 .
• The uniform scheme: all wi are identical. Formally,
w = ||w||1 ·
(
1
N
,
1
N
, · · · , 1
N
)
.
2.3. The modeling of APT-based cyber attack-defense processes
For the purpose of modeling APT-based cyber attack-defense processes, the following assumptions are made.
(A1) Due to external attack, at any time secure node i gets compromised at rate αxiδyi . This assumption is rational,
because the rate is proportional to the attack strength and is inversely proportional to the prevention strength.
(A2) Due to internal infection, at any time secure node i gets compromised at rate
f
(
β
∑N
j=1 a ji1{x j (t)=1}
)
δyi
. This assumption
is rational, because the rate is proportional to the combined infection strength and is inversely proportional to
the prevention strength.
(A3) Due to recovery, at any time compromised node i becomes secure at rate γzi. This assumption is rational,
because the rate is proportional to the recovery strength.
Next, let us model the cyber attack-defense process. Let ∆t be a very small time interval. Following the above
assumptions, we have that, for i = 1, · · · ,N, t ≥ 0,
Pr{Xi(t + ∆t) = 1 | Xi(t) = 0} = ∆t
δyi
αxi + f
β N∑
j=1
a jiC j(t)

 + o(∆t),
Pr{Xi(t + ∆t) = 0 | Xi(t) = 1} = γzi∆t + o(∆t).
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Invoking the total probability formula, rearranging the terms, dividing both sides by ∆t, and letting ∆t → 0, we get a
dynamic model as follows.
dCi(t)
dt
=
αxi
δyi
−
(
αxi
δyi
+ γzi
)
Ci(t) +
1
δyi
[1 −Ci(t)] f
β N∑
j=1
a jiC j(t)
 , t ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · ,N. (1)
We refer to the model as the generic secure-compromised-secure (GSCS) model, because the function f meets a set of
generic conditions. The diagram of state transitions of node i under this model is given in Fig. 1. To a certain extent,
the GSCS model accurately captures APT-based cyber attack-defense processes.
Figure 1: Diagram of state transitions of node i under the GSCS model.
Let
Ω =
{
(c1, c2, · · · , cN)T ∈ RN+ | ci ≤ 1, i = 1, · · · ,N
}
.
It is trivial to show that C(t) ∈ Ω for t ≥ 0.
3. Theoretical analysis of the GSCS model
This section is dedicated to studying the dynamical properties of the GSCS model.
3.1. Preliminaries
For fundamental knowledge on differential dynamical systems, see Ref. [38].
Lemma 1. (Chaplygin Lemma, see Theorem 31.4 in [39]) Consider a smooth n-dimensional system of differential
equations
dx(t)
dt
= f((x(t)), t ≥ 0
and the corresponding system of differential inequalities
dy(t)
dt
≥ f((y(t)), t ≥ 0
with x(0) = y(0). Suppose that for any a1, · · · , an ≥ 0, there hold
fi(x1 + a1, · · · , xi−1 + ai−1, xi, xi+1 + ai+1, · · · , xn + an) ≥ fi(x1, · · · , xn), i = 1, · · · , n.
Then y(t) ≥ x(t) for t ≥ 0.
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For fundamental knowledge on fixed point theory, see Ref. [40].
Lemma 2. (Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem, see Theorem 4.10 in [40]) Let D be a nonempty, bounded, closed and
convex subset of Rn, and let f : D→ D be a continuous function. Then f has a fixed point.
For fundamental knowledge on matrix theory, see Ref. [41]. Let diag(ai) denote the diagonal matrix with diagnoal
entries a1, a2, · · · , aN , and let col(ai) denote the column vector of components a1, a2, · · · , aN . This paper considers
only real square matrices. For a matrix A, let s(A) denote the maximum real part of an eigenvalue of A. A is Metzler
if its off-diagonal entries are all nonnegative.
Lemma 3. (Section 2.1 in [42]) Let A be an irreducible Metzler matrix. Then the following claims hold.
(a) If there is a positive vector x such that Ax < λx, then s(A) < λ.
(b) If there is a positive vector x such that Ax = λx, then s(A) = λ.
(c) If there is a positive vector x such that Ax > λx, then s(A) > λ.
3.2. A preliminary result
For the GSCS model, let
Ci =
αxi
αxi + γδyizi
, Ci =
αxi + f (β
∑N
j=1 a ji)
αxi + γδyizi + f (β
∑N
j=1 a ji)
, i = 1, · · · ,N.
The following lemma will be useful in the subsequent study.
Lemma 4. Let C(t) = (C1(t),C2(t), · · · ,CN(t))T be a solution to the SCS model. Then there are t0 > 0 and c > 0 such
that
min
1≤i≤N
Ci(t) ≥ c, t ≥ t0.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume xi0 > 0. It follows from the GSCS model that
dCi0 (t)
dt
≥ αxi0
δyi0
−
(
αxi0
δyi0
+ γzi0
)
Ci0 (t), t ≥ 0.
Obviously, the comparison system
dui0 (t)
dt
=
αxi0
δyi0
−
(
αxi0
δyi0
+ γzi0
)
ui0 (t), t ≥ 0,
with ui0 (0) = Ci0 (0) admits Ci0 > 0 as the globally stable equilibrium. By Lemma 1, we have
Ci0 (t) ≥ ui0 (t), t ≥ 0.
So,
lim inf
t→∞ Ci0 (t) ≥ limt→∞ ui0 (t) = Ci0 .
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Thus, for any 0 < ε < Ci0 , there is t1 > 0 such that
Ci0 (t) ≥ Ci0 − ε, t ≥ t1.
As G is strongly connected, there is ai0 j0 = 1. Hence,
dC j0 (t)
dt
≥ 1
δy j0
f
(
β
(
Ci0 − ε
))
−
[
1
δy j0
f
(
β
(
Ci0 − ε
))
+ γz j0
]
C j0 (t), t ≥ t1.
Obviously, the comparison system
dv j0 (t)
dt
=
1
δy j0
f
(
β
(
Ci0 − ε
))
−
[
1
δy j0
f
(
β
(
Ci0 − ε
))
+ γz j0
]
v j0 (t), t ≥ t1
with v j0 (t1) = C j0 (t1) admits
f
(
β
(
Ci0−ε
))
f
(
β
(
Ci0−ε
))
+γδy j0 z j0
as the globally stable equilibrium. By Lemma 1, we have
C j0 (t) ≥ v j0 (t), t ≥ t1.
So,
lim inf
t→∞ C j0 (t) ≥ limt→∞ v j0 (t) =
f
(
β
(
Ci0 − ε
))
f
(
β
(
Ci0 − ε
))
+ γδy j0 z j0
.
In view of the arbitrariness of ε, we get that
lim inf
t→∞ C j0 (t) ≥
f
(
βCi0
)
f
(
βCi0
)
+ γδy j0 z j0
> 0.
The lemma follows by repeating the argument.
3.3. The equilibrium
Theorem 1. The GSCS model admits a unique equilibrium. Denote this equilibrium by C∗ = (C∗1, · · · ,C∗N)T . Then
C∗i > 0,Ci ≤ C∗i ≤ Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
Proof. Let K =
∏N
i=1
[
Ci,Ci
]
. Define a continuous mapping H = (H1, · · · ,HN)T : K → [0, 1]N as follows.
Hi(w) =
αxi + f (β
∑N
j=1 a jiw j)
αxi + γδyizi + f (β
∑N
j=1 a jiw j)
, w = (w1, · · · ,wN)T ∈ K.
It is trivial to show that C is an equilibrium of the GSCS model if and only if C is a fixed point of H. Furthermore, it is
easy to show that H maps K into itself. It follows from Lemma 2 that H has a fixed point, denoted C∗ = (C∗1, · · · ,C∗N)T .
This implies that C∗ is an equilibrium of the GSCS model, where Ci ≤ C∗i ≤ Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ N. By Lemma 4,
C∗i > 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
The remaining thing to do is to show that C∗ is the unique fixed point of H. On the contrary, suppose H has a fixed
point other than C∗. Denote this equilibrium by C∗∗ = (C∗∗1 , · · · ,C∗∗N )T . Let
ρ = max
1≤i≤N
C∗i
C∗∗i
, i0 = arg max
1≤i≤N
C∗i
C∗∗i
.
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Without loss of generality, assume ρ > 1. It follows that
C∗i0 = Hi0 (C
∗) ≤ Hi0 (ρC∗∗) =
αxi0 + f (ρβ
∑N
j=1 a ji0C
∗∗
j )
γδyi0 zi0 + αxi0 + f (ρβ
∑N
j=1 a ji0C
∗∗
j )
<
αxi0 + f (ρβ
∑N
j=1 a ji0C
∗∗
j )
γδyi0 zi0 + αxi0 + f (β
∑N
j=1 a ji0C
∗∗
j )
≤
αxi0 + ρ f (β
∑N
j=1 a ji0C
∗∗
j )
γδyi0 zi0 + αxi0 + f (β
∑N
j=1 a ji0C
∗∗
j )
< ρHi0 (C
∗∗) = ρC∗∗i0 .
This contradicts the assumption that C∗i0 = ρC
∗∗
i0
. Hence, C∗ is the unique fixed point of H. The proof is complete.
3.4. The stability of the equilibrium
Theorem 2. The equilibrium C∗ of the GSCS model is stable with recpect to Ω.
Proof. Let C(t) = (C1(t),C2(t), · · · ,CN(t))T be a solution to the GSCS model. By Lemma 4, there are t0 > 0 and
c > 0 such that
min
1≤i≤N
Ci(t) ≥ c, t ≥ t0.
Let
Z(C(t)) = max
1≤i≤N
Ci(t)
C∗i
, z(C(t)) = min
1≤i≤N
Ci(t)
C∗i
, t ≥ t0.
Define a function V as
V(C(t)) = max{Z(C(t)) − 1, 0} + max{1 − z(C(t)), 0}.
It is easily verified that V is positive definite with respect to C∗, i.e., (a) V(C(t)) ≥ 0, and (b) V(C(t)) = 0 if and only
if C(t) = C∗. Next , let us show that D+V(C(t)) ≤ 0, t ≥ t0, where D+ stands for the upper-right Dini derivative of V
along C(t). To this end, we need to show the following two claims.
Claim 1: D+Z(C(t)) ≤ 0 if Z(C(t)) ≥ 1. Moreover, D+Z(C(t)) < 0 if Z(C(t)) > 1.
Claim 2: D+z(C(t)) ≥ 0 if z(C(t)) ≤ 1. Moreover, D+z(C(t)) > 0 if z(C(t)) < 1. Here D+ stands for the lower-right
Dini derivative.
Proof of Claim 1: Choose k0 such that
Z(C(t)) =
Ck0 (t)
C∗k0
, D+Z(C(t)) =
C
′
k0
(t)
C∗k0
.
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Then,
C∗k0
Ck0 (t)
C
′
k0 (t) =
αxk0
δyk0
(
1 −Ck0 (t)
) C∗k0
Ck0 (t)
+
1
δyk0
(
1 −Ck0 (t)
) C∗k0
Ck0 (t)
f
β N∑
j=1
a jk0C j(t)
 − γzk0C∗k0
≤ αxk0
δyk0
(
1 −C∗k0
)
+
1
δyk0
(
1 −C∗k0
) C∗k0
Ck0 (t)
f
β N∑
j=1
a jk0C j(t)
 − γzk0C∗k0
≤ αxk0
δyk0
(
1 −C∗k0
)
+
1
δyk0
(
1 −C∗k0
)
f
β C∗k0Ck0 (t)
N∑
j=1
a jk0C j(t)
 − γzk0C∗k0
≤ αxk0
δyk0
(
1 −C∗k0
)
+
1
δyk0
(
1 −C∗k0
)
f
β N∑
j=1
a jk0C
∗
j
 − γzk0C∗k0 = 0,
where the second inequality follows from the concavity of f , and the third inequality follows from the monotonicity
of f . This implies D+Z(C(t)) ≤ 0. As the first inequality is strict if Z(C(t)) > 1, we get that D+Z(C(t)) < 0 if
Z(C(t)) > 1. Claim 1 is proven.
The argument for Claim 2 is analogous to that for Claim 1 and hence is omitted. Next, consider three possibilities.
Case 1: Z(C(t)) < 1. Then z(C(t)) < 1, V(C(t)) = 1 − z(C(t)). Hence, D+V(C(t)) = −D+z(C(t)) < 0.
Case 2: z(C(t)) > 1. Then Z(C(t)) > 1, V(C(t)) = Z(C(t)) − 1. Hence, D+V(C(t)) = D+Z(C(t)) < 0.
Case 3: Z(C(t)) ≥ 1, z(C(t)) ≤ 1. Then V(C(t)) = Z(C(t)) − z(C(t)), D+V(C(t)) = D+Z(C(t)) − D+z(C(t)) ≤ 0.
Moreover, the equality holds if and only if C(t) = C∗.
The theorem follows from the LaSalle Invariance Principle.
Let C(t) denote the expected fraction of compromised nodes in the cyber network at time t, C∗ the expected
fraction of compromised nodes in the cyber network when the expected network state is C∗.
C(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Ci(t), C∗ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
C∗i . (2)
The following result is a corollary of Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. Consider the GSCS model (1). Then C(t)→ C∗ as t → ∞.
Obviously, C∗ is dependent upon the four technical levels, the interconnection network, and the attack and defense
schemes. We refer to the four technical levels and the interconnection network as parameters, because they are almost
fixed. We refer to the attack and defense schemes as independent variables, because the attack scheme is flexibly
choosable by the attacker, and the defense scheme is flexibly choosable by the defender. Formally,
C∗ = C∗(x, y, z;α, β, δ, γ,G).
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3.5. The limit security of cyber networks
In practice, C∗ can be estimated simply through sampling and averaging. This method for estimating C∗ is valu-
able, because it does not require the defender to know the attack and infection tecnical levels as well as the attack
scheme. Therefore, C∗ can be used to evaluate the security of the cyber network. Below let us define a security metric
of cyber networks under APTs.
Definition 1. Given the four technical levels, the interconnected network, the attack scheme and the defense scheme,
the limit security of the cyber network is defined as
S L = 1 −C∗, (3)
This security metric of cyber networks is rational, because the higher the limit security, the securer the cyber
network would be. The limit security is dependent upon the four technical levels, the interconnection network, the
attack scheme and the defense scheme. Formally,
C∗ = C∗(x, y, z;α, β, δ, γ,G).
4. The influence of some factors on the limit security of a cyber network
In this section, we theoretically investigate the influence of some factors, including the technical levels, the attack
and defense resources per unit time per node, and the addition of new edges to the interconnection network, on the
limit security of a cyber network. For this purpose, define an irreducible Metzler matrix as follows.
M = diag
β(1 −C∗i ) f ′
β N∑
j=1
a jiC∗j

 AT − diag
αxi + γδyizi + f
β N∑
j=1
a jiC∗j

 .
Lemma 5. M is invertible, and M−1 is negative.
Proof. As f is concave, we have
f
′
β N∑
j=1
a jiC∗j
 ≤ f
(
β
∑N
j=1 a jiC
∗
j
)
β
∑N
j=1 a jic
∗
j
.
So,
MC∗ = diag
β(1 −C∗i ) f ′
β N∑
j=1
a jiC∗j

 AT C∗ − diag
αxi + γδyizi + f
β N∑
j=1
a jiC∗j

 C∗
≤ diag
β(1 −C∗i ) f
(
β
∑N
j=1 a jiC
∗
j
)
β
∑N
j=1 a jic
∗
j
 AT C∗ − diag
αxi + γδyizi + f
β N∑
j=1
a jiC∗j

 C∗
= −col
αxi + f
β N∑
j=1
a jiC∗j
C∗i
 < 0.
It follows from Lemma 3(a) that s(M) < 0. This implies that M is invertible. As M is Metzler, irreducible and
Hurwitz, M−1 is negative [43].
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4.1. The influence of the four technical levels
Theorem 3. For the GSCS model (1), we have ∂C∗
∂α
> 0, ∂C∗
∂β
> 0, ∂C∗
∂γ
< 0, ∂C∗
∂δ
< 0.
Proof. We prove only ∂C
∗
∂β
> 0, because the arguments for the remaining claims are similar. As C∗ is the equilibrium
for the GSCS model, we have
Fi(β; C∗1,C
∗
2, · · · ,C∗N) = αxi − (αxi + γδyizi)C∗i + (1 −C∗i ) f
β N∑
j=1
a jiC∗j
 = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
Differentiating on both sides with respect to β, we get
∂Fi
∂β
+
∂Fi
∂C∗1
· ∂C
∗
1
∂β
+ · · · + ∂Fi
∂C∗N
· ∂C
∗
N
∂β
= 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
Calculations show that
M
∂C∗
∂β
= −diag
(1 −C∗i ) f ′ (β N∑
j=1
a jiC∗j )
 AT C∗.
By Lemma 5, we have
∂C∗
∂β
= −M−1 · diag
(1 −C∗i ) f ′ (β N∑
j=1
a jiC∗j )
 AT C∗.
where M−1 is negative. As G is strongly connected, AT C∗ is positive. Hence, ∂C∗
∂β
> 0.
As a corollary of this theorem, the influence of the four technical levels on the limit security of a cyber network is
shown as follows.
Corollary 2. For the GSCS model (1), we have ∂S L
∂α
< 0, ∂S L
∂β
< 0, ∂S L
∂γ
> 0, ∂S L
∂δ
> 0.
This corollary manifests that the limit security of a cyber network goes up with the prevention and recovery
technical levels, and comes down with the attack and infection technical levels. These results accord with our intuition.
Hence, the defender must try his best to enhance the prevention and recovery technical levels.
4.2. The influence of the attack and defense resources per unit time per node
Theorem 4. For the GSCS model (1), we have ∂C∗
∂xi
> 0, ∂C∗
∂yi
< 0, ∂C∗
∂zi
< 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
The argument for the theorem is analogous to that for the previous theorem. As a corollary of this theorem, the
influence of the attack and defense resources per unit time per node on the limit security of a cyber network is shown
as follows.
Corollary 3. For the GSCS model (1), we have ∂S L
∂xi
< 0, ∂S L
∂yi
> 0, ∂S L
∂zi
> 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
This corollary demonstrates that the limit security of a cyber network rises with the resource per unit time used
for preventing or recovering a node, and falls with the resource per unit time used for attacking a node. Again, these
results are consistent with our intuition. As a consequence, the defender is suggested to configure more defense
resource.
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4.3. The influence of the addition of new edges to the interconnection network
Theorem 5. For the GSCS model, we have ∂C∗
∂ai j
> 0, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N, i , j.
The argument for the theorem is analogous to that for Theorem 3. As a corollary of this theorem, the addition of
new edges to the interconnection network on the limit security of a cyber network is shown as follows.
Corollary 4. For the GSCS model (1), we have ∂S L
∂ai j
< 0, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N, i , j.
This corollary manifests that the limit security of a cyber network declines with the addition of new edges to the
interconnection network. Hence, a well-connected cyber network is more vulnerable to APTs. Therefore, the defender
is suggested to limit the number of connections in the interconnection network.
5. The influence of two other factors on the limit security of a cyber network
In this section, we experimentally examine the influence of two factors, the ratio of the prevention resource to
the recovery resource, and the defense resource per unit time with given ratio of the attack resource to the defense
resource, on the limit security of a cyber network. In the following experiments, the generic function in the GSCS
model is set to be f (x) = x1+x , and the interconnection network takes value from a set of six non-isomorphic trees
shown in Fig. 2.
(a) G1 (b) G2 (c) G3
(d) G4 (e) G5 (f) G6
Figure 2: Six non-isomorphic trees with six nodes and five edges.
12
5.1. The influence of the ratio of the prevention resource to the recovery resource
For a GSCS model, the ratio of the prevention resource to the recovery resource is
rPR =
||y||1
||z||1 .
We examine the influence of rPR on the limit security of a cyber network through simulation experiments.
Experiment 1. Consider 504 GSCS models, where α = 0.05, β = 0.01, γ = 1, δ = 1, G varies from G1 to G6,
||x||1 = 1, ||y||1 = r1+r , ||z||1 = 11+r , r ∈ { 14 , 13 , 12 , 1, 2, 3, 4}, with (a) uniform x, y and z; (b) uniform x and y, degree-first
z; (c) uniform x and z, degree-first y; (d) uniform x, degree-first y and z; (e) degree-first x, uniform y and z; (f) degree-
first x and z, uniform y; (g) degree-first x and y, uniform z; (h) degree-first x, y and z; (i) degree-last x, uniform y and
z; (j) degree-last x, uniform y, degree-first z; (k) degree-last x, degree-first y, uniform z; (l) degree-last x, degree-first
y and z. For each of the GSCS model, the limit security of the cyber network is shown shown in Fig. 3. It can be seen
that, with the increase of rPR, the limit security of a cyber network goes up first but then it goes down. Moreover, the
limit security attains the maximum in the proximity of rPR = 1.
Many similar experiments exhibit qualitatively similar phenomena. It is concluded that, with the increase of the
ratio of the prevention resource to the recovery resource, the limit security of a cyber network goes up first but then it
goes down. Moreover, the limit security attains the maximum when the prevention resource is close to the recovery
resource. Hence, the defender is suggested to distribute the total defense resource equally to prevention and recovery.
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Figure 3: The limit security of the cyber network for each of the 504 GSCS models, where α = 0.05, β = 0.01, γ = 1, δ = 1, G varies from G1 to
G6, ||x||1 = 1, ||y||1 = r1+r , ||z||1 = 1r , r ∈ { 14 , 13 , 12 , 1, 2, 3, 4}, with (a) uniform x, y and z; (b) uniform x and y, degree-first z; (c) uniform x and z,
degree-first y; (d) uniform x, degree-first y and z; (e) degree-first x, uniform y and z; (f) degree-first x and z, uniform y; (g) degree-first x and y,
uniform z; (h) degree-first x, y and z; (i) degree-last x, uniform y and z; (j) degree-last x, uniform y, degree-first z; (k) degree-last x, degree-first y,
uniform z; (l) degree-last x, degree-first y and z. It can be seen that, with the increase of rPR, the limit security of a cyber network goes up first but
then it goes down. Moreover, the limit security attains the maximum in the proximity of rPR = 1.
5.2. The influence of defense resource per unit time given the ratio of the attack resource to the defense resource
For a GSCS model, the ratio of the attack resource to the defense resource is
rAD =
||x||1
||y||1 + ||z||1 .
Obviously, the limit security of a cyber network declines with rAD. A question arises naturally: given the ratio of the
attack resource to the defense resource, how about the impact of the defense resource on the limit security of a cyber
network? Now, let us answer the question through simulation experiments.
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Experiment 2. Consider 504 GSCS models, where α = 0.1, β = 0.05, γ = 0.5, δ = 1, G varies from G1 to G6,
rAD = r, ||y||1 = ||z||1 = s, s ∈ {2, 3, · · · , 10}, ||y||1 = s1, with (a) r = 12 , uniform x, y and z; (b) r = 1, uniform x, y and
z; (c) r = 2, uniform x, y and z; (d) r = 12 , uniform x, degree-first y and z; (e) r = 1, uniform x, degree-first y and z;
(f) r = 2, uniform x, degree-first y and z; (g) r = 12 , degree-first x, uniform y and z; (h) r = 1, degree-first x, uniform y
and z; (i) r = 2, degree-first x, uniform y and z; (j) r = 12 , degree-first x, y and z; (k) r = 1, degree-first x, y and z; (l)
r = 2, degree-first x, y and z. For each of the GSCS models, the limit security of the cyber network is shown in Fig. 4.
It can be seen that the limit security of a cyber network ascends with s.
Many similar experiments exhibit qualitatively similar phenomena. It is concluded that, given the ratio of the
attack resource to the defense resource, the limit security of a cyber network goes up with the defense resource. This
result sounds a good news to the defender. Indeed, configuring more defense resource is always an effective means of
protecting against APTs.
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Figure 4: The limit security of the cyber network for each of the 504 GSCS models, where α = 0.1, β = 0.05, γ = 0.5, δ = 1, G varies from G1 to
G6, rAD = r, ||y||1 = ||z||1 = s, s ∈ {2, 3, · · · , 10}, ||y||1 = s1, with (a) r = 12 , uniform x, y and z; (b) r = 1, uniform x, y and z; (c) r = 2, uniform x,
y and z; (d) r = 12 , uniform x, degree-first y and z; (e) r = 1, uniform x, degree-first y and z; (f) r = 2, uniform x, degree-first y and z; (g) r =
1
2 ,
degree-first x, uniform y and z; (h) r = 1, degree-first x, uniform y and z; (i) r = 2, degree-first x, uniform y and z; (j) r = 12 , degree-first x, y and
z; (k) r = 1, degree-first x, y and z; (l) r = 2, degree-first x, y and z. For each of the GSCS models, the limit security of the cyber network is shown
in Fig. 4. It can be seen that the limit security of a cyber network ascends with s.
6. Concluding remarks
This paper is devoted to measuring the security of cyber networks under APTs. An APT-based cyber attack-
defense process has been modeled as a dynamical system, which is shown to exhibit the global stability. Thereby, the
limit security has been introduced as a new security metric of cyber networks. The influence of different factors on
the limit security has been expounded. On this basis, some means of defending against APTs are recommended.
There are lots of open problems about APTs. In the case that the attack scheme is available, the defender must
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maximize the limit security over all possible defense schemes, so as to minimize the loss caused by APTs. When the
attack scheme is not avaliable, the defender should furher minimize this maximized limit security over all possible
attack schemes, so as to evaluate the worst-case security of the cyber network. In this work, the attack and defense
schemes are both assumed to be unvaried over time. In practice, the attacker may flexibly alter the attack scheme to
chase the highest profit, and the defender may flexibly change the defense scheme to maximize the security of the
cyber network. In such scenarios, the evaluation of the security of cyber networks would involve optimal control
theory [44–46] or/and dynamic game theory [47, 48].
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